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Can an Invisible Word Create Confusion?
The Need for Clarity in the Law of Trademark
Infringement through Internet Metatags
TOM MONAGAN
The federal judiciary has struggled in recent years to extend principals of
traditional trademark analysis onto the Internet This tension is particularly
apparent in cases involving a website operator's use of another company's
trademarks to attract consumers to his own website. This note provides a critical
evaluation of the various approaches the federal courts have taken on the issue
of trademarks used in keyword metatags. It analyzes the courts' application of
trademark doctrines such as fair use, initial interest confusion, and trademark
dilution to this novel area of law. The note argues that the federal courts have,
for the most part, failed to acknowledge the fair use defenses and have
unnecessarily strayed from traditional trademark infringement analysis, relying
unnecessarily (and incorrectly) on less traditional doctrines to find consumer
confusion. The note concludes that instead of considering metatag use as stand-
alone acts of infringement, the courts should require the plaintiff to produce
actual evidence from the defendant's destination website to prove a likelihood of
confusion. This return to more traditional trademark analysis may be the only
proper way to resolve these controversies.
I. INTRODUCTION
It's official: Internet euphoria has taken over the universe. Without a doubt,
the last six to seven years have seen a "tidal wave" of new developments, a
"digital revolution" delivering an entirely "New Economy." This is the "New
Millennium," the "Internet Age" where the old ways of doing things are being
thrown out to make room for an entirely new paradigrn. However, when it comes
to trademark law, should the federal courts be throwing out the Lanham Act1 with
that old Industrial Age bathwater? As the judiciary has struggled to grasp the
complexities of Internet communications, it appears that the courts are deferring
less to precedent and more to the tidal wave of change.
This dynamic is particularly apparent in the area of trademark infiingement
on the Internet The courts have been very willing to create new rules and
remedies to deal with new issues of trademark violations on the World Wide Web
(the Web).2 While issues such as domain name infringement have been given
* The author is a third-year JJ.)JM.B.A. candidate at The Ohio State University College of
Law and the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University.
1 The Lanham Act is also known as the Trademark Act of 1946 and is codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
2 One particular area of trademark infringement on the Web-the issue of trademarks used
in website domain names, often referred to as "cybersquatting"--has received significant
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significant attention by commentators, the issue of trademarks used in keyword
metatags3-the computer-coded terms that help search engines find websites-
has received much less critical commentary. Considering the significance to the
future of global commerce and communication, however, these digital disputes
deserve some attention of their own.
Keyword metatag battles traditionally pit entrepreneurs, who claim that the
use of a competitor's trademarks in metatags is a legitimate way to build website
traffic, against established corporations, who see metatag infringement as nothing
more than an illegal ploy to grab market share by stealing goodwill. In addition to
the battles between big and small business, keyword metatag disputes sometimes
involve clashes between corporations and individual consumer critics who claim
that their First Amendment rights to editorial comment (usually through a website
with a URL like "bigcompanysucks.com") depend on the ability to use their
target's tradename in their keyword metatags.
This note represents a critical evaluation of the various approaches the federal
courts have taken on the issue of trademarks used in keyword metatags. The note
begins by providing a very brief overview of relevant trademark law in Part IL
Part Im introduces some of the recent cases involving trademark infringement
through keyword metatags. Part IV analyzes the federal courts' application of
specific trademark issues, including fair use, initial interest confusion, and
trademark dilution, to the area of trademark infringement through keyword
metatags. The note argues that the federal courts have, for the most part, failed to
acknowledge the fair use defense and have unnecessarily strayed from traditional
attention from commentators in recent years. For a brief discussion of this issue, see infra note
25.
3 The term "metatag" refers to a keyword that a website creator enters into HTML
(hypertext markup language) code at the top of a webpage. A collection of metatags is often
referred to as a meta description. The court in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), effectively described the process that
occurs when an Internet user attempts to find a website by entering a keyword into his own
Internet search engine:
When a keyword is entered, the search engine processes it through a self-created index of
websites to generate a (sometimes long) list relating to the entered keyword. Each search engine
uses its own algorithm to arrange indexed materials in sequence, so the list ofwebsites that any
particular set ofkeywords will bring up may differ depending on the search engine used. Search
engines look for keywords in places such as domain names, actual text on the webpage, and
metatags. Metatags are HTML code intended to describe the contents of the website. There are
different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us are the "description" and
"keyword" metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe the website; the
keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the contents of the website.
The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the webpage, the more likely it
is that the webpage will be "hit" in a search for that keyword and the higher on the list of "hits"
the webpage will appear.
Id. at 1045 (citation omitted).
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trademark infringement analysis. Further, the note explains why metatag
infringement claims should not be considered stand-alone claims and why,
instead, metatag claims should require some actual evidence from the defendant's
destination website to prove a likelihood of confusion. In the end, this note
recommends a return to traditional trademark analysis to resolve these
controversies.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law generally exists to protect businesses from the theft or
dilution of their brand identities. 4 While state unfair competition laws have played
an important role in the development of trademark law, the most often used
protections for a trademark holder are found in the Federal Trademark
Infringement Act of 1946, also known as the Lanham Act.5 Under the Lanham
Act, the holder of a trademark can bring a number of claims to protect his
investment in a particular trademark or trade name.6 These include the two
primary claims of trademark infringement7 and trademark dilution.8
A. Trademark Infringement and the "Likelihood of Confitsion " Standard
To prove a claim of trademark infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant's actions were "likely to cause confusion" among consumers about
4 The Lanham Act defines "trademark" as:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof--() used by a person, or (2)
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the
principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C § 1127 (1994). A "trademark" has also been referred to as "a sign,
device, or mark by which the articles produced or dealt in by a particular person or organization
are distinguished or distinguishable from those produced or dealt in by others." 74 AM. JUR. 2D,
Trademarks and Tradenames § 1 (1974).
5 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127 (1994). For a more detailed discussion of
Lanham Act provisions relevant to metatag and other Internet issues, see Marguerite S.
Dougherty, Note, The Lanham Act: Keeping Pacewith Technology, 7 J.L. &POL'Y 455 (1999).
6
'Trade name' means "any name used by a person to identify his or her business or
vocation." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
7 A plaintiff can establish a trademark infringement claim under sections 32 and 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. While section 32 protects only those marks that have been registered with the
U.S. Patent and Trademarks Office, section 43(a) applies to unregistered marks. See infra note
9 and accompanying text
8 The claim of"dilution" was added to the Lanham Act in 1996. See infra notes 20-21.
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the source or affiliation of competing products or servicesP The method for
determining which disputed marks are "likely to cause confusion" has been the
source of significant debate since passage of the Lanham Act. Currently, the
majority of circuits rely on various versions of an eight-factor test to determine
the likelihood of confusion. The test includes most or all of the following criteria:
[1] similarity of the conflicting designations; [2] relatedness or proximity of the two
companies' products or services; [3] strength of [the plaintiff's] mark; [4] marketing
channels used; [5] degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting
goods; [6 the defendant's] intent in selecting its mark [7] evidence of actual
confusion; and [8] likelihood of expansion in product lines. I°
In the Ninth Circuit, the circuit of origin for many of the significant metatag
cases, the eight-factor test was borrowed fromAMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boatsl1 and
is commonly referred to as the Sleekcraft test.12
9 The Lanham Act designation of trademark infringement in section 32(1) states:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.., shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 11 14(I)(a). Section 43(a) provides that:
(I) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person... shall be
liable in a civil action by an person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
10 Brookfield Comms, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053-54 (9th Cir.
1999).
11 599 F.2d 341,348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
12 The Ninth Circuit's version of the eight-factor test was cited by the court in Brookfield
Communications:
We look to the following factors for guidance in determining the likelihood of confusion:
similarity of the conflicting designations; relatedness or proximity of the two companies
products or services; strength of Brookfield's mark; marketing channels used; degree of care
likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting goods; West Coast's intent in selecting its mark;
evidence of actual confusion; and the likelihood of expansion in product lines. ... These eight
factors are often referred to as the Sleekcraft factors.
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This modem test for confusion "encompasses any type of confusion,
including: confusion of source; confusion of sponsorship; confusion of affiliation;
or confusion of connection." 13 The test, therefore, is meant to protect a trademark
holder from use of its mark "on any product or service which would reasonably
be thought by the buying public to come from the same source, or thought to be
affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner." 14
An alternative argument related to trademark infringement is a claim in tort
of unfair competition.15 The unfair competition provision is found in section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 6 the same section that protects holders of non-
registered trademarks from infringement. The provision captures commercial
conflicts such as "passing off'17 and false advertising. Although many trademark
infringement actions include section 43(a) claims, many courts do not make a
functional distinction between section 32 and section 43(a) claims, since the
analysis required for both is very similar.' 8
Broolfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1053-54 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997), and RESrATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 20-23 (1995)). See also Sleekeraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 348 (applying the above
factors to find that defendant boat maker's use of a mark similar to plaintiff boat maker's
Slickcraft mark was infringement). The test commonly cited by the Second Circuit can be
found in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that
the likelihood of confusion includes such factors as: the strength of plaintiff's mark, the degree
of similarity between the two marks, the market proximity of the two products, actual
confusion, defendant's good faith in adopting its mark, the quality of defendant's products, and
the sophistication of buyers).
134 J. THOMAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TXADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETmON
§ 24:6, (4th ed. 2000).141Id
15 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (allowing a civil action to be brought for
deceptive advertising or other acts likely to cause confusion as to the authenticity of one's
goods or services).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
17 An interesting provision in section 43(a) involves "passing off" or using a "false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" in commerce, that
"is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(aXl)(A) (1994). While this provision provides a cause of action if the plaintiffs mark
has not been registered, it is especially important where the plaintiff uses a generic phrase to
identify its goods and a competitor has attempted to pass itself off as the plaintiff to consumers.
See Jeffrey P. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Metatags: An Intellectual
Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243; 249-51 (1998) (discussing the claims of passing off and false
advertising).
18 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came to this conclusion in its decision in Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.8 (9th Cir.
1999). The court stated that while section 32 provides protection for registered marks,
section 43(a) "protects against infringement of unregistered marks and trade dress as well as
2001]
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B. Trademark Dilution
In an effort to extend protections for trademark holders beyond situations of
actual source confusion, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995.19 The Act protects trademark holders against dilution, which it defines as
"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
and services."20 The Act, however, does not specify how dilution occurs or how it
may be detected. As a result, courts have struggled with how to differentiate the
requirements of a dilution claim from the requirements of an infringement
claim.21 As stated, the primary point of distinction is that a dilution claim does not
require the proof of actual confusion as to the source of goods or services.22
However, since the dilution analysis looks at elements such as the goods being
"mistakenly associated," a certain degree of confusion seems to be required.2 3
registered marks and protects against a wider range of practices such as false advertising and
product disparagement." Id. at 1046-47 n.8 (citations omitted). The court said that "despite
these differences, the analysis under the two provisions is oftentimes identical" and elected to
refer to all of the plaintiff's claims by the term "infringement."Id at 1047 n.8.
One commentator notes that common law unfair competition tort claims and state statutes,
including unfair and deceptive acts and practices statutes (UDAP), may also provide an
opportunity for plaintiffs to bring unfair competition claims in keyword metatag cases which do
not involve the use of trademarks. However, as of mid-1999, there were no reported cases in
which trademarks were not the basis for the metatag claim. See Brian Kennan, Diverting Traffic
on the Web, appended to Bruce E. H. Johnson, Regulatory Update: Internet Sheriffs Approach
the Electronic Frontier, 579 PLI/Pat 67, 84, at 94 (1999).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1998).
2015 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1998). The amendment, added in January 1996, gives the full
definition of "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of--(1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception.' In a federal dilution action, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving (1)
that it owns a famous mark, and (2) that defendant's mark dilutes the famous mark. However,
because the amendment does not specify how dilution occurs or how it may be detected, this
area of the law is relatively unsettled. In addition, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act preempts
any state dilution action if a defendant has a federal trademark registration. See § 1125(c)(3).
2 1 See Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (discussing dilution and infringement). In Ringling
Bros. the court states:
22 See id
23 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031
(2nd Cir. 1989) (stating that for a dilution case, "there must be some mental association
between plaintiff's and defendant's marks"). The Act specifically excludes confusion from the
dilution inquiry. However, it appears from the federal court's interpretation of the statute that
the definition of blurring is somewhat related to the concept of confusion.
Blurring results from an incorrect association of the marks in consumer's minds. And this
association is mistaken or confused to the degree that the marks and the goods or services they
identify are not and should not be associated. To the contrary, these marks and their owners are
[Vol. 62:973
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Recent cases suggest that there are two forms of trademark dilution-dilution
by blurring and dilution by tamishment. 4 According to one noted treatise on
trademark law, "[d]ilution by blurring occurs if the defendant uses the word as its
own trademark for goods that are so different that no confusion of source or
sponsorship can occur."25 Dilution by tamishment occurs when the trademark use
causes some association in the consumer's mind between a senior mark and a
junior mark representing a good of lesser quality.2 6
II. THE METATAG CASES
A. The Early Cases: Domain Name Disputes and the Metatag Sideshows
During the first few years of the Internet's early growth in the mid-1990s, the
most notable intellectual property disputes were the battles over website domain
names. These "cybersquatting" battles erupted when one company or individual
registered and used another company's trade-name as their own website domain
name, or held that domain for a ransom to be paid by the original trademark
owner. The courts and eventually the U.S. Congress settled many of these
"cybersquatting" disputes with novel remedies, including transferring the
registered domain name to the holder of the original trademark.27 In fact it was
distinct, and should be seen and understood to be distinct by persons coming into contact with
either mark. To the extent that persons seeing the marks mistakenly associate them, the famous
mark's power to identify and distinguish goods or services is diluted. Thus, while "source
confusion" is irrelevant to the dilution inquiry, dilution by blurring entails confusion in that the
famous and junior marks become wrongly or mistakenly associated in the minds of consumers.
Ringling Bros. 955 F. Supp. at 615 (citation omitted). While the federal dilution statute is
relatively untested, a number of state cases shed light on an appropriate dilution analysis. See
generally Kuester & Nieves, supra note 17, at 251-52 (discussing state dilution statutes that
recognize that dilution occurs through either tamishment or blurring).
24 A famous trademark is diluted when subsequent uses by a third party "blur the
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of
confision" by consumers. H.R REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1029. See also Keuster & Nieves, supra note 17, at 251-53 (discussing the elements of
dilution).
25 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at § 24:103.
2 6 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998)).
277These "cybersquatting' disputes follow primarily two lines. In the first, one party has
registered an Internet domain name, for example "post-it.com," that exactly duplicated a
previously registered trademark of another company. In deciding many of these cases, the
courts have developed a remedy that was not previously illuminated in the Lanham Act-that
of transferring a domain name to the original trademark owner. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 10003, 10005 (D. Minn. 1998) (finding "post-it.com" to be
"confusingly similar" to 3M's registered Post-It® trademark); Public Serv. Co. v. Nexus
Energy Software, Inc. 36 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding "energyplace.com"
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not until 1997, relatively late in the early evolution of trademark disputes on the
Intemet, that the issue of trademark infringement through keyword metatags
appeared in the federal courts-and right off the bat the courts failed to separate
the technical and substantive issues of metatags from the domain name issue with
which they were more familiar.
1. Playboy Goes to War
The first reported claim of trademark infringement through keyword
metatags was raised by the adult entertainment giant Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
(Playboy or PEI) in a suit against a small company known as Calvin Designer
Label.28 Playboy's primary claim was that Calvin's use of the domain name
"playboyxxx.com" amounted to trademark infringement.29 However, Playboy
also claimed that defendant's use of Playboy's trademarks "Playboy®" and
"Playmate(" in defendant's keyword metatags also infringed on plaintiff's
marks.3 0 The court ultimately granted a cease and desist order that amounted to a
blanket prohibition on defendant's use of the Playboy name on the Internet-
and "Energy Place" to be virtually identical); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci,
No. 97-7492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 at *2 (2nd Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (concluding that
"plannedparenthood.com" and ' Planned Parenthood" were essentially identical). In addition,
the court in Broolfield Communications found that West Coast Video's use of moviebuff.corn
was confusingly similar to Brookfield's registered service mark ' Moviebuff." Brookfield
Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F. 3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999). The second line
of disputes involve one party using a domain name that closely resembles an existing
trademark. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (granting defendant summary judgment on claim that site
www.compupix.com/ballysucks tarnished plaintiff's mark and finding it used in a
noncommercial manner in an editorial context to express an opinion). In general, courts have
found that these domain names amount to fair use of the protected trademarks. In 1999,
Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Protection Act, which permits a court to order the
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner
of the mark for any domain name registered before, on, or after the date of enactment of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(IXC). Many of these disputes are also currently resolved through an
arbitration proceeding conducted by the World Intellectual Property Organization or another
approved arbiter under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. See WIPO,
WIPO GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUT'ION POLICY, at
http'/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/guide/index.html#a (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
28 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
29 Id. at 1221.
30ld.
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including in keyword metatags3 1 It did not, however, consider the metatag issue
separately, and the opinion therefore offers little guidance on this matter.32
Not only was Calvin Designer the first case of metatag infringement, it was
the first in a line of cases in which Playboy would successfully claim trademark
infringement through metatag use. The second major case in that line was
Playboy Enterprises v. AsiaFocus InternationaP3 in which the Eastern District
Court of Virginia found in favor of Playboy on a similar claim of trademark
infringement, reasoning that AsiaFocus's use of the registered trademarks
"playboy®" and "Playmate®" as metatags created a likelihood of confusion. The
court stated that "[tihe defendants have promoted their websites, adult photo
collections and merchandise in such a way as to create a false association between
the defendants and PEL' 34
As in the Calvin Designer case, the AsiaFocus dispute was not focused on
metatags alone. It also involved the use of Playboy trademarks in a domain name,
because AsiaFocus was marketing its adult photos through the domain "asian-
playmates.cor" and selling "Playmates" merchandise through the same site. Just
like the court in Calvin Designer, the AsiaFocus court did not explain the factual
basis for its finding of confusion on the metatag claim specifically or why the
metatag use amounted to "willful deception."35 It appears that the metatag issue
was caught up in the broader issue of AsiaFocus's attempt to associate the "asian-
playmates" site with PEL
3 1 /1d
32 Combining the metatag infringement issue with the domain name analysis, the court
stated simply that defendant was enjoined from doing anything 'likely to cause confusion"
including:
using in any manner the PLAYMATE or PLAYBOY trademarks, and any other term or terms
likely to cause confusion therewith, including PLAYMATELIVE or "playboyxxx.com" or
"playmatelive.com," as Defendants' domain name, directory name, or other such computer
address, as the name of Defendants' website service, in buried code or metatags on their home
page or webpages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or information or on other goods or
services, or in connection with the advertising or pmrmotion of their goods, services or websites.
Id The defendant was blatantly attempting to cause confusion about the source of the goods
available on its own website, and the metatags were a small part in a larger picture of deception
and confusion. According to the decision, defendant had used PEI's trademarks in its domain
names (playboyxxx.com and playmatelive.com), in a magazine (Playmate Live Magazine), and
in a tagline ("Get it all here at Playboy") id; see also Ann Davis, 'Invisible' Trademarks on the
Web Raise NovelIssue ofInfringement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at B10.
33 No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998).
34 1d at*6.
35 d at *8. In its finding of trademark infringement and trademark dilution, the court's
only discussion of actual or likely confusion focused solely on the domain name issue. The
court did not provide a separate consideration of the metatag issue. See infra Part IV.3 and text
accompanying note 116.
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2. Other Early Disputes Involving Domain Names and Metatags
Although Playboy was the most active plaintiff in these early cases, it was not
the only company in 1997 and 1998 filing suits that included metatag
infringement claims. A small handful of similar disputes could be found in
various federal district courts. These early cases, however, offer little in the way
of clear analysis on which subsequent opinions could be based. While nearly all
of the cases found for the plaintiffs, the opinions offer little substantive support
for their findings.36 For example, Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices,37
a case that grew out of a domain name dispute, involved a metatag infringement
argument between competitors engaged in the business of detecting radon gas and
lead paint in homes. Niton accused Radiation Monitoring of copying the metatag
descriptions from the Niton website into the metatag description code for
Radiation Monitoring's own site.38 The court found that Radiation Monitoring's
use of Niton's trademarks in its metatags was likely to create confusion.3 9
In Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts,40 a Colorado district court
enjoined defendant a website development company, from using the trade name
of the law firm Oppedahl & Larson in its keyword metatags. The opinion
provides no commentary on the metatag claim, stating simply that "pursuant to
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act ... [defendants] are hereby permanently enjoined
36 See e.g., Insituform Tech., Inc. v. Nat'l EnviroTech Group, No. C-97-2064 EDL (E.D.
La. Aug. 26, 1997), available at http//www.cll.comfcasel.htm (finding that National
EnviroTech Group's use of Insituform's registered trademarks INSITUFORM and INSITUPIP
in its metatags amounted to trademark infringement.). See also Kuester & Nieves, supra note
17, at 243.
37 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
38 The court found that Radiation Monitoring Devices (RMD) used the following meta-
description on its pages: "The Home Page of Niton Corporation, makers of the finest lead,
radon, and multi-element detectors." Id. at 104.
39 Id. at 105. In describing the plaintiff's claims, the decision did not say whether the claim
was of infringement, dilution, or unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, but
did say that Niton "alleges that RMD uses false and misleading statements in RMD's
advertising, marketing and promotion of its own product in Massachusetts and interstate
commerce." Id. at 103. In fact, the prayer for injunction on the metatag issue was filed in the
middle of other litigation surrounding allegedly misleading statements made by RMD on its
website. The court suggests that the use of such a descriptive metatag that included a string of
terms identical to those on the RMD site was evidence of an intent to confuse web searchers. I
at 105. The court found that a plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that:
RMD's Internet websites and means of attracting users of the Internet to examine these websites
have been used by RMD in a way likely to lead users to believe that ... RMD is also known as
Niton Corporation, that RMD is affiliated with Niton Corporation ... and that RMD websites
are Niton websites.
Id.
40 No. C-97-Z-1592,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23105 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 1997).
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from using plaintiff's mark 'Oppedahl & Larson' or the words 'Oppedahl' or
'Larson' in webpages without authorization of plaintiff."41 It offers no analysis of
the intent or effect of the metatag use, even though an Advanced Concepts
principal claimed to the Wall Street Journal that he had never attempted to lead
consumers into believing that Advanced Concepts was affiliated with Oppedahl
& Larson but had simply used the Oppedahl keywords because Advanced
Concept's own website mentioned an article written by an Oppedal attomey.42
B. The Recent Cases: Initial Interest Confusion or Total Confusion?
As the courts began to separate the metatag issue from the domain name
issue, they immediately struggled with how to analyze this new type of "invisible
word" trademark. While some courts attempted to apply a likelihood of confusion
analysis, others looked to less-traditional doctrines for answers. The result has
been a shift from caselaw lacking analysis to caselaw with so much conflicting
analysis that it lacked a clear direction for subsequent litigants.
1. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.
In 1999, for the first time in a metatag case, a plaintiff offered a new basis for
a claim of trademark infingement through keyword metatags. In Brookfield
Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,43 the plaintiff, a computer
software manufacturer based in Southern California claimed that regional video-
rental chain West Coast Video was poised to use Brookfield's trademark
'"noviebuff' in its website domain name and in keyword metatags.44 Soon after
4 1 1a
42 See Davis, supra note 32, at BIO, shedding light on the impetus for the Oppedahl &
Larson dispute:
In another case, Robert A. Welch, president of an Internet marketing company, Advanced
Concepts says he added the name of the Frisco, Colo., law firm Oppedahl & Larson to his
invisible coding because his website mentioned an article written by the firm. He says he didn't
realize it might be illegal. "It was one of those 4 o'clock in the morning mistakes, when you're
not careful about what you're putting in," he says.
In July, the law firm sued Mr. Welch and others in federal court in Denver. Parlner Carl
Oppedahl says Advanced Condepts may have been trying to use the firm's name to get clients.
"They offer domain-name registration services, and our firm has provided a lot of legal services
related to domain-name challenges," he says.
Mr. Welch says he never intended to compete with Mr. Oppedahl. He has removed the
reference, but the suit still stands.
Id.
43 174 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
44Brookfield's original complaint alleged that West Coast's use of "moviebuff.con
would constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of sections 32 and
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Id. at 1043.
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bringing suit, Brookfield filed a temporary restraining order to prevent West
Coast Video from launching its 'moviebuff.com" site and from using the term
'MovieBuff' in any way to market videos.45 After the district court dismissed the
claim, and after the actual launch of West Coast's 'moviebuff.com" site, the case
ended up in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.4 6 The Ninth Circuit began by
4 5 The application for temporary restraining order (RO) sought to enjoin West Coast
[from using .. in any manner... the mark MOVIEBUFF, or any other term or terms likely to
cause confusion therewith, including moviebuffcom, as West Coast's domain name ... as the
name of West Coast's website service, in buried code or metatags on their home page or
webpages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or information on other goods or services.
Id
46 The debate at the district court level focused on which party was the prior user and
rightful holder of a trademark in the trade name "MovieBuff." The district court initially held
that West Coast was the prior user and dismissed Brookflield's suit. d at 1041. However,
Brookfield had held a federal trademark since mid-1997 on the term MovieBuff, which it had
already used in commerce since 1993 to identify software and database products containing
movie industry news and statistics. Id at 1041-42. Brookfield marketed these MovieBuff
products to movie industry insiders and movie fans. Id at 1041. Sometime in 1996, Brookfield
attempted to register the domain name 'moviebufficom" with Network Solutions, Inc., but was
told that the requested domain name had already been registered by West Coast Video. !d at
1042. Rather than contesting West Coast's registration, most likely because no clear policy for
contesting registrations existed at the time, Brcokfield began to use its "moviebuffonline.com"
website to market its MovieBuff products. Id. In late 1998, Brookfield learned that West Coast
Video planned to launch a website at moviebuff.com that would contain a searchable database
similar to Brookfield's MovieBuffproduct. Id
During the district court dispute, West Coast claimed that it was the first user of
'MovieBuff' because it had used its federally registered trademark "The Movie Buff's Movie
Store" since 1986 in advertisements, promotions, and letterhead.
Alternatively, West Coast claimed seniority on the basis that it had garnered common-law rights
in the domain name by using "moviebuff.com" before Brookfield began offering its
"MovieBuff' Internet-based searchable database on the Web. In addition to asserting seniority,
West Coast contended that its planned use of ' moviebuffcom" would not cause a likelihood of
confusion with Brookfield's trademark 'MovieBuff' and thus would not violate the Lanham
Act.
Id at 1043. The district court found that West Coast Video, in fact, and not Brookfield was the
senior user of the MovieBuff mark and denied the TRO. West Coast then proceeded with the
launch of its 'moviebuff.com" website, and Brookfield promptly filed an emergency motion for
injunction pending appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed
the lower court's decision, finding that Brookfield was, in fact, the senior user of the MovieBuff
mark. Id at 1053. According to the court:
West Coast's first use date was neither February 1996 when it registered its domain name with
Network Solutions as the district court had concluded, nor April 1996 when it first used
"moviebuff.conm" in e-mail communications, but rather November 1998 when it first made a
widespread and public announcement about the imminent launch of its website. Thus, West
Coast's first use of 'moviebuffcom" was preceded by Brookflield's first use of'"MovieBuff' in
conjunction with its online database, making Brookfield the senior user.
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analyzing whether West Coast's use of MovieBuff was "likely to create
confusion." The court at first considered a traditional approach to "likelihood of
confusion" analysis and found that a likelihood of actual source confusion did not
exist.47 However, the court then entertained plaintiff's alternate theory of "initial
interest confusion."48 The theory states, generally, that although a consumer is not
confused about the ultimate source of goods when he makes a purchase, the initial
confusion caused by the unauthorized use of another company's trademark may
be enough to capture a sale using that competitor's brand equity.49 Under this
theory, the court granted the injunction.50 The court thus opened the door for
future metatag claims based on this initial interest doctrine.
2. Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications
The plaintiff in the next major metatag case was a familiar one in the realm of
Internet trademark law. On April 15, 1999, one week before the Broolfield
Communications decision, Playboy filed a trademark infringement through
metatags action against co-defendants Netscape Communications (Netscape) and
Excite in the United States District Court for the Southern District Court of
California.5 l This case was the first to focus almost solely on the issue of metatag
infringement However, the outcome was very different from the cases that had
gone before it especially from the Ninth Circuit precedent in Broolfield
Communications.52 The district court in Netscape Communications ultimately
refused to extend the initial interest confusion doctrine, arguing first, that the use
of trademarks in metatags is not a "use" of trademarks at all, and second, that the
use in this case would not create initial confusion.
The dispute focused on an advertising practice used by Netscape and co-
defendant Excite. The two companies offered various adult entertainment
advertisers the opportunity to display advertising targeted to more than 450
keywords, including the words "playboy" and "playmate. '53 Playboy claimed
IdL
47Id at 1062.
48 Id
4 9 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the evolution and application of the initial interest
confusion doctrine).
50 The court explains initial interest confusion as "the use of another's trademark in a
manner calculated 'to capture initial consumer attention."' Id (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254,257-58 (2d Cir. 1987)).
51 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Comims., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
52 See supra Part mILBI
5 3 The package allowed advertisers to purchase banner ads that were targeted to specific
keywords. For example, if an Excite search engine user entered the search term "playboy," the
search results page would include all results for that term as well as the advertiser's banner ad at
the top of the page.
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that Netscape was infringing on and diluting its trademarks in "Playboy®" and
"Playmate®" by (1) marketing and selling those words, (2) programming the
banner ads to run in response to those searches, and (3) actually displaying those
banner ads on the search results page.54
In response, Netscape claimed that they did not use the words "Playboy" or
"playmate" as trademarks, and that their use of the terms was permitted as a fair
use under trademark law.55 The court sided with Netscape and Excite, finding that
the defendants did not use the trademarks "as trademarks." According to the
court: "it is undisputed that an Internet user cannot conduct a search using the
trademark form of the words, i.e., Playboy@ and Playmate®. Rather, the user
enters the generic word 'playboy' or 'playmate' .... Thus, plaintiff's argument
that defendants 'use' plaintiff's trademarks falls short."56
The court, however, proceeded to engage in a further discussion that sheds
significant light on the metatag issue. The court analyzed, whether the plaintiff's
claims of infringement and dilution could be met assuming that defendants' use
of the trademarks constituted an actual "use." On the infringement claim, the
court stated that plaintiff "has presented no evidence" that confusion was likely to
result from the use of these words as metatags. 57 The court also rejected the
plaintiff's theory of "initial interest confusion"--a theory borrowed from the
Brookfield Communications case. The court distinguished its facts from those in
Broolfield Communications on the ground that the word at the center of the
debate in Brookfield Communications---moviebuff'-was not an English word.
In other words, there was no question that the defendant's use of "MovieBuff"
was a use of the plaintiff's trademark. The Netscape Communications court's
second rationale for distinguishing the initial interest confusion theories in these
54 Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
55Id. at 1073.
56Id. at 1073-74. The court additionallynoted:
Thus, whether the user is looking for goods and services covered by PEI's trademarks or
something altogether unrelated to PEI is anybody's guess. Plaintiff guesses that most users
searching the Web for "playboy" and "playmate' are indeed looking for PEI sites, goods and
services. Based on that theory, plaintiff argues that since defendants also speculate that users
searching for "playboy" and "playmate" are looking for things related to Playboy® and
Playmate®, defendants use the trademarks when they key competing adult entertainment goods
and services to the generic "playboy" and "playmate."
Id. at 1073.
57Id at 1079 nn.33-36. In addition, the court stated that the plaintiff had not provided
evidence to prove confusion. For example, the court stated that 'PEI has not presented a
consumer survey of likelihood of confusion, despite having ... significant financial resources to
pay for such a survey." In addition, the court noted that "[n]either Excite nor Netscape have
received any complaints or comments from consumers who were confused in any way by a
banner advertisement on the Excite or Netscape search results page that resulted from a search
for the words 'playboy' or 'playmate.' Id.
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two cases was that the defendant in Brookgfield Communications competed in the
same market for the same product.58 Finally, the Netscape Communications court
entertained, the plaintiff's claim of trademark dilution. The court found that even
if the defendants' use of the plaintiff's mark constituted a trademark use, the
plaintiff had not proven that its marks had been blurred or tarnished.59 The district
court's decision to deny the preliminary injunction was affirmed a few months
later by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.60
IV. THE METATAG CASES: A MISAPPLICATION OF
TRADEMARK ANALYSIS
A. Is a Metatag a "Fair Use" of a Trademark?
1. Is a Metatag Use Really a Trademark "Use"?
The most fimdamental issue in the cases of trademark infringement through
keyword metatag is whether the use of a trademark in a metatag is really the
"use" of a trademark at all. The Central District Court of California raised this
issue in Netscape Communications.61 In fact, it became the hook on which the
court hung its decision in favor of the defendants. The court reasoned that the
defendants' use of "playmate" and "playboy" in metatags did not amount to the
use of a trademark at all because 'Excite and Netscape do not use PEI's 'bunny'
logo or any stylized lettering used by PE." 62 The court stated further:
[I]t is undisputed that an Internet user cannot conduct a search using the trademark
form of the words, i.e., Playboy@ and Playmate@. Rather, the user enters the generic
word "playboy" or "playmate." It is also ndisputed that the words "playboy" and
"playmate" are English words in their own right, and that there exist other trademarks
on the words wholly unrelated to PEI. Thus, whether the user is looking for goods and
services covered by PEI's trademarks or something altogether unrelated to PEI is
anybody's guess.63
In fact, during oral argument, PEI itself acknowledged that the keywords
entered into the search engine by the user were not actually the Playboy marks.64
58 Id at 1074-75.
59 Id at 1075.
60 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., No. 99-56230, No. 99-56231,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30215 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 1999).
6 1Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1073-74.
62/ d at 1079.
63 Id at 1073.
64,PEI admits that Interet users who type in 'playboy' and 'playmate' as search terms
are not infringing PEI's trademarks. See Reporter's Transcript of May 24, 1999, Hearing at
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Yet, PEI insisted that the words as programmed by the website designers, and, in
this case, the words as sold by the search engine companies, were uses of the
trademark. They claimed that the sellers and borrowers were using the mark
because they were attempting to co-opt goodwill from PEI by speculating that
people searching for the Playboy sites would use those terms.65
It is without a doubt that a word alone-that is a word without a symbol-
can be a trademark In fact, the Lanham Act definition of a trademark "includes
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof."66 However, the
second requirement of a trademark is that it be used by a person "in commerce...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown."67
The question, therefore, is whether the use of a word alone without any
identifying marks or stylized text-without any graphic identification that
associates that word with a specific product-is a use to identify a source of a
goods, and therefore, has the ability to cause consumer confusion. According to
one famous trademark treatise, "evidentiary factors relevant to whether
defendant's use is as a trademark are the lettering, type style, size and visual
placement and prominence of the challenged words. '68 For example, use of the
words "MOBILE MECHANICS" as a service mark for auto repairs was found to
be an infringement of the Mobil Oil trademark, because the defendant "used the
words on signs, letterheads and advertisements as a mark and in virtually identical
lettering style as plaintiff's MOBIL. '69 This distinction of whether the use is "as a
P.43 ('We're not in any way claiming that people who use the Internet, Playboy, Playmate,
themselves are infringing.')"Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 n.6.
65 See id at 1073-74. Specifically, the court stated that:
plaintiff argues that since defendants also speculate that users searching for "playboy" and
"playmate" are looking for things related to Playboy® and Playmate@, defendants use the
trademarks when they key competing adult entertainment goods and services to the generic
"playboy" and "playmate."
[However] [Nlaintiff has not shown that defendants use the terms in their trademark form,
i.e., Playboy® and Playmate@, when marketing to advertisers or in the algorithm that
effectuates the keying of the ads to the keywords. Thus, plaintiff's argument that defendants
"use" plaintiffs trademarks falls short
Id.
66 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
67 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphases added).
68 4 McCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:46. McCarthy cites, among other cases, Woodroast
Sys., Inc. v. Restaurants Unlimited, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 906 (8th Cir. 1993), and states that the
court held that the factors to be examined to determine if use of a trademark or service mark has
occurred include: "whether the term is used to attract public attention; whether the term is used
prominently;, whether the term is in a different type size or style; whether the term is set off; and
whether the term actually describes the product being sold." Id. at § 11:46 nA.
69 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 11:46.
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mark" is important, since "the only type of use which should suffice as a 'fair use'
is use by defendant in a non-trademark sense."70 In other words, designation as a
"non-trademark" use is very often the first hurdle over which a party must leap in
order to prove that its use of another party's mark qualifies as a non-infringing fair
use.
2. The Fair Use Defense and How It Applies
The courts in both Brookfield Communications and Netscape
Communications state, correctly, that trademark infringement cannot exist if the
use is allowable under the "fair use" doctrine of the Lanham Act. The Netscape
Communications court relates its "use as a mark" analysis to the doctrine of fair
use by stating that "because [the defendants] use the words 'playboy' and
'playmate' as words in the English language rather than as trademarks... [their]
use of the words is fair use."71 However, not all 'non-trademark' uses amount to
fair use and not all fair use provisions require a "non-trademark' use. In actuality
the line is somewhat less distinct For this reason, the courts should have provided
further analysis of the fair use provision.
The fair use provision is embodied in section 33(b) of the Lanham Act.72 The
fundamental motivation for the fair use provision is that limitations on the use of
specific words present significant First Amendment concerns. The court in
Netscape noted this concern claiming that an unlimited ability to protect a non-
distinctive mark would allow Playboy to "effectively monopolize the use of these
words on the Intemet."73
Courts tend to classify and analyze fair use claims under categories of use
that include, for example, descriptive or comparative use. A descriptive word is a
70 Id
71 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1087 (C.D.
Cal. 1999).
72 The Act provides that:
Tihe use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual
name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin ....
Lanham Act § 33(bX4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(bX4) (1994).
73 Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. The court continued: "This violates
the First Amendment rights of (a) Excite and Netscape; (b) other trademark holders of
'playboy' and 'playmate'; as well as (c) members of the public who conduct Intemet searches."
Id In support of this statement, the court cited Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1998), where it found that "prohibiting [defendant] from using
[plaintiff's] name in the machine readable code would effectively isolate him from all but the
most savvy of Interet users.'
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word that had primary meaning in the English language prior to its use as a
trademark. In that regard it is still protected for use as a descriptive word by
parties other than the trademark holder. The trademark use of the word is
considered to have "secondary meaning" as an identifier, and only use of that
word in its secondary meaning is protected.
Sometimes the difference between a word used in a descriptive manner and a
unique word or "famous mark," which deserves near fIll trademark protection
with few opportunities for fair use, may appear almost insignificant This was the
case in Brookfield Communications, where the court found that while "Movie
Buff' may be a descriptive term, 'MovieBuff' was not-the difference of one
space between the two words making the term unique.74 The Brookfield
Communications court referred to an often-cited fifth Circuit case, New Kids on
the Block v. News America Publishing, which found that 'The 'fair use' defense,
in essence, forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a descriptive term for his
exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of
their goods."75 As stated by the court in Netscape Communications, "the law is
that a word which is in its primary meaning merely descriptive of the goods to
which it is applied may not be appropriated as the exclusive trademark of a single
seller.'76
Generally, any use other than a use to identify the source of products or
services is considered a descriptive, fair use. For example, in the case of Playboy
v. Welles,77 PEI sought to enjoin former Playboy Playmate Teri Welles from
using the words "playboy" or "playmate" on her website or in her metatags.
However, the court found that the use was a descriptive fair use since Welles
minimized the use of Playboy's marks and used the terms in metatags "in good
747The court stated specifically that:
We agree that West Coast can legitimately use an appropriate descriptive term in its
metatags. But "MovieBuff' is not such a descriptive term. Even though it differs from "Movie
Buff' by only a single space, that difference is pivotal. The term "Movie Buff' is a descriptive
term, which is routinely used in the English language to describe a movie devotee. 'MovieBuff'
is not.
Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F. 3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999).
75New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980))
76 Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1086-87 (quoting Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970)):
The law is that a word which is in its primary meaning merely descriptive of the goods to which
it is applied may not be appropriated as the exclusive trademark of a single seller, since one
competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing his
fellows from fairly describing their own goods.
7 7 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
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faith to index the content of her website.''78 Further, the court found that the uses
of the trademarks on her website were 'legitimate editorial uses of the term
Playboy" to reference her identity as "Playboy Playmate of the Year 198 V7 9
Another frequently cited example of fair use is found in New Kids on the
Block The court found that the Dallas Morning News newspaper could publish
an announcement containing musical band New Kids on the Block's trademarked
name, without consent, to advertise a "900" telephone line that allowed fans to
vote for their favorite member of the band. According to the court, "the trademark
laws do not give [plaintiffs] the right to channel their fans' enthusiasm (and
dollars) only into items licensed or authorized by then.''80 The court stated
further that in order to be considered a descriptive fair use, the product identified
with the mark must "be one not readily identifiable without the use of the
trademark; only so much of the mark ... may be used as is reasonably
necessary... ; and third, the user must do nothing ... in conjunction with the
mark [to] suggest sponsorship or endorsement."81
A party can also use a competitor's trademark to make comparisons to that
competitor's goods or services, provided that it does not create confusion about
the source of its own goods or services in the process.82 In fact, the district court
in Brookfield Communications specifically stated that West Coast's use of the
Brookfield mark to identify Brookfield as a competitor would constitute a fair
use.
83
The use of a trademark in a metatag might be considered similar to the use of
a trademark to make "comparisons" to a competitor's products. The objective of
78 Id at 1104.
7 91d
80 New Kids on the Block 971 F.2d at 309.
811d at 308.
82 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Saxony Prods., Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1975)
(finding that "[defendant] could use [plaintiff's] trademark SHALIMAR to apprise consumers
that Fragrance S is 'LIKE' or 'similar' to SHALIMAR"), and Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v.
ParfUms De Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that the phrase "If you like
OBSESSION you'll love CONFESS" did not infiringe)).
83 The court stated:
Moreover, West Coast is not absolutely barred from using the term 'MovieBuff." As we
explained above, that term can be legitimately used to describe Brookfield's product For
example, its webpage might well include an advertisement banner such as "Why pay for
MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for FREE?" which clearly employs
"MovieBuff' to refer to Brookfield's products. West Coast, however, presently uses
Brookflield's trademark not to reference Brookfield's products, but instead to describe its own
product (in the case of the domain name) and to attract people to its website in the case of the
metatags). That is not fair use.
Brookfield Conms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999).
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the typical defendant in the metatag cases is similar to the objective of a company
using another company's trademarks in comparison advertising-that is, to
encourage comparison shopping or to persuade a consumer to consider the
metatag user's product or service as they are shopping. However, the Brookfield
Communications court suggested that using a competitor's trademark in a metatag
can never be a fair use to identify a competitor's products. The court said that
only the use of the trademark on the destination website can be a comparative fair
use. According to the court:
[Brookfield's] webpage might well include an advertisement banner such as ''Why
pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for FREE?" which clearly
employs "MovieBuff" to refer to Brookfield's products. West Coast, however,
presently uses Brookfield's trademark not to reference Brookfield's products, but
instead to describe its own product (in the case of the domain name) and to attract
people to its website in the case of the metatags. That is not fair use.84
Like most courts analyzing metatag cases, the court's reasoning here has a
fatal flaw. It suggests that the use of the trademark on the webpage itself is subject
to traditional infringement and fair use analysis, but the use of the trademark in
the metatag is not. In other words, the court offers no rationale for why it should
consider the metatag use to be dramatically different from the uses on the site to
which those metatags lead. In Part V of this note, the author argues that the courts
should apply traditional infringement analysis to metatag uses of trademarks. In
cases in which traditional analysis does not support a claim of infringement
through metatags (the majority of cases), the courts should consider the metatags
only as evidence of confusion created by defendant's use of trademarks on the
destination website.85
3. Does the Good Faith Requirement Apply to Metatags?
Exactly when a use constitutes a descriptive or a good-faith comparative fair
use is an issue of fact and, therefore, often the victim of subjective interpretation.
Brookfield Communications and other decisions leave a troublesome question:
Does a descriptive or comparative word used in a metatag always have a non-
descriptive and non-comparative meaning? The only legitimate argument that
these marks cannot constitute fair use is the requirement of "good faith" in the fair
use provision of the Lanham Act. The provision states that a fair use is a use that
"is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or
services of such party."86
841d.
85 See infra Part V.
86 15 U.S.C. § 1115(bX4) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc. presents one example of a finding of lack of good faith in a
trademark case.87 The defendant an Illinois used car dealer, modified Ringling
Brothers' protected trademark "The Greatest Show on Earth," calling its own car
lot 'The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth." The case was tried under the Illinois
dilution statute and not the federal Lanham Act, thus the statutory requirement
was not that the use caused actual confusion but that the use diluted the
distinctiveness of the original mark; however, the case does offer a useful
analysis.88 When the defendant claimed that the Lanham Act's fair use defense
pre-empted Illinois's dilution statute, the court disagreed and held that the
defendant's use was not a good-faith use and was not descriptive of defendant's
products or services. While defendant claimed that it had adopted its slogan
"without discussion or consideration of Ringling Bros.' Slogan," the court
without actually discussing the contrary evidence in its opinion, concluded that
the evidence on record did not bear out a finding of good faith. 89
It is important to note the Ringling Bros. court's interest in the defendant's
graphical treatment of his own mark. The court highlights the fact that defendant
"erected two signs on its showroom roof that in big, bold, red circus-style letters
proclaimed Celozzi-Ettelson 'The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth' and
"[b]eginning in mid-1986, these signs were also visible in a television
hdvertisement for Celozzi-Ettelson that included a view of the premises."90 The
court was clearly concerned that the dealership intentionally attempted to create a
visual association between itself and the circus. In this case, the lack of good faith
is fairly obvious. The car dealer chose this tagline to refer to his own goods and
services because consumers already associated a similar mark with important
product attributes such as quality, tradition, fun, and value-which he wanted
consumers to assign to the Celozzi-Ettelson dealership. It is difficult to see how
the use of a trademark in an invisible metatag can constitute a similar proactive
attempt to create such a visual association in the minds of consumers.
A metatag use of a trademark is, at its most basic level, an attempt to ensure
that people who use the Web to find a product or service are aware that a
competing product or service exists. In that regard, the user is definitely
borrowing on the goodwill that the trademark holder has created in the trade-
87 See Ringling Bros.-Bamrnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480,484 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that car dealer's use of tagline "The
Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" constituted trademark infringement because dealer lacked
good faith intent necessary for fair use defense).
88 See id at 482-83 (discussing the statutory requirements of IL. REV. STAT. ch. 140,
§ 22).
89Id at 484.
90Ia at481.
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name.91 However, the courts have not explained why a metatag use automatically
constitutes a bad faith use while, for example, a comparative, descriptive use
outside of the Internet does not. Assigning a de facto malicious intent to the use of
trademarks in metatags raises two problems. First, there are those cases in which
either a malicious intent to prosper from a competitor's goodwill does not exist or,
at the very least, the issue bears investigation. Second, and more importantly,
although the defendant's intent is an important factor in traditional eight-factor
infringement analysis, it is only one small factor that can help determine whether
a likelihood of confusion exists. This concern reminds us of the primary
motivation for trademark protection-to prevent companies from exploiting
unwitting consuners.92 The courts have offered no clear argument for why an
intent to confuse or dilute should automatically be presumed simply because the
defendant uses a competitor's trademark in a metatag.
B. "Initial Interest Confusion" Is Incorrectly Applied
The different results in Netscape and Brookfield Communications perfectly
exemplify the trouble that the courts have had finding a new framework for
handling the metatag issue under existing law. Once the courts have determined
that the metatag use does not constitute a fair use, their next challenge has been to
explain how a trademark used in a metatag can cause actual confusion about the
source of a company's products.
Assume, for example, that a search engine user entered the search term
"moviebuff," hoping to find the Brookfield website. The search results page
might then present the user with a list that included two sites, the Brookfield
9 1 It is worth noting that if the goal oftrademark law, especially the dilution amendment, is
to protect the value of goodwill already developed in a mark, then the people who claim
dilution by metatag use may, ironically, have failed to develop the goodwill that the law was
meant to protect. After all, a search engine user has become a "searcher" only because he does
not know the URL (domain name) of the company he is seeking. In fact, a company that
adequately develops goodwill by investing in the promotion of its trade-name and domain name
will not face the problem of Internet users not knowing the company Web address. Thus, the
company's "valued" customers would never actually need to search for their website, and the
metatag problem would not be an issue.
92 1 McCARTHY, supra note 13, § 2:33:
It is accurate to state that, "Confusion of the public is the essence of both trademark
infringement and unfair competition." Almost all trademark disputes are between firms that use
conflicting marks; the consumer is not a party to the litigation. But it is the consumer's state of
mind that largely controls the result....
... Thus, "the plaintiff is acting, not only in its own interest, but in the public interest."
Id. quoting Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and General
Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891 (lst Cir. 1925).
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site-called, for example, "brookfield.com" or "brookfieldmoviebuff.com" (or
even moviebufficorn at a time after West Coast had been forced to surrender that
name)-and the West Coast Video site--'westcoastvideo.conr." There is no real
likelihood that the user would be confused about which website was associated
with the product he sought He would click on the Brookfield website from the
search results list and be on his way. If the search engine user chose the wrong
site, he would quickly realize that he was not in the right place-at least in those
cases where the defendant does not actually intend to pass off his site as the
plaintiff's.
The Broofield Court, in fact, stated explicitly that under the Sleekcraft
analysis there would be no actual likelihood of confusion based on the facts in its
case. The court said that because the list produced by the search engine would
include both West Coast's and Brookfield's websites, and because the user
choosing the "westcoastvideo.com" website would know whose site he was
visiting, "it is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be confused about whose
site he has reached or to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's
website."93
The Broolfield court gave as its only reason for not applying the eight-factor
Sleekcraft analysis that "the traditional eight-factor test is not well-suited for
analyzing the metatags issue."94 The court, however, never explained why the
likelihood of confusion analysis is "not well-suited." It claimed only that while
there is no source confusion because "consumers know they are patronizing West
93 Brookfield Comms. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).
The court stated further
Although entering "MovieBuff' into a search engine is likely to bring up a list including
"westcoastvideo.corn" if West Coast has included that term in its metatags, the resulting
confusion is not as great as where West Coast uses the 'moviebuff.con" domain name. First,
when the user inputs ' MovieBuff' into an Internet search engine, the list produced by the search
engine is likely to include both West Coast's and Brookfield's websites. Thus, in scanning such
list, the Web user will often be able to find the particular website he is seeking. Moreover, even
if the Web user chooses the website belonging to West Coast, he will see that the domain name
of the website he selected is "westcoastvideo.com." Since there is no confusion resulting from
the domain address, and since West Coast's initial webpage prominently displays its own name,
it is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached or
to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's website.
Id. The court in Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts came to a similar conclusion:
In fact, there is no confusion because even when a search engine user enters trademarked terms
in the hopes of finding the trademark owner's site, ifa metatag user's site is returned, so very
likely is the trademark holder's site if it exists. Therefore, the opportunity for confusion is
limited.
Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-Z-1592 (D. Colo. filed July 23, 1997),
http://www.patents.com/adcomplain.sht. See also Kuester & Nieves, supra note 17, at nn.180-
83 and accompanying text.
94 Broolfield Communications, 174 F3d, at 1062 n.24.
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Coast rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the
sense that, by using 'moviebuff.com' or 'MovieBuff' to divert people looking for
'MovieBuff' to its website, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill
that Brookfield developed in its mark." 95
1. The Origins of the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
The initial interest confusion doctrine is a relatively recent phenomenon in
the development of trademark law. The Brookfield court cited the case of
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,96 as precedent 97 Dr. Seuss
held that the use of another's trademark in a manner calculated "to capture initial
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of
the confusion, may be still an infringement."9 8 Dr. Seuss relied on the Second
Circuit case of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.99 Mobil Oil claimed
that defendant's use of the trade-name Pegasus, together with the use of a winged
horse in its logo, would result in initial confusion in the petroleum products
market as to the affiliation between the companies (since Mobil also used a
winged horse in its own logo).100 The court found that "potential purchasers
would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum" because they might
believe the companies were associated °1 The court in Pegasus Petroleum
upheld the district court's finding of a likelihood of confusion even though, in the
words of the Broolfield court; "these potential customers would generally learn
that Pegasus Petroleum was unrelated to Mobil well before any actual sale was
consummated." 102
In its decision, the Pegasus Petroleum court cited its own circuit's
precedent 0 3 in Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons. 104 In Steinway & Sons, the plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that its trademark "Grotrian-Steinweg" did not
95 Id at 1062.
96 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
97 Brookfeld, 174 F.3d, at 1062-63.
98Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d, at 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) See SecuraCom Consulting, Inc. v.
Securacomm Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286, 298 (D. NJ. 1997) (noting that "initial interest confusion"
is actionable even if no sale is completed).
99 818 F. 2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987)
100 Id. at 256.
10 1 Id. at 259-60;
102 Brookfield Comms. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F. 2d 254,260 (2d Cir, 1987)).
103 Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F2d at 260.
104 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975). The court found confusion because Grotrian-Steinweg
misled Steinway shoppers into an initial interest in Steinweg pianos through deliberate tactics to
exploit the similarities between the two trade-names. See id at 1341-42.
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infringe Steinway's trademark rights.105 Steinway counterclaimed, asserting that
the plaintiff, through its use of the "Grotrian-Steinweg" mark, attracted people
who were really interested in "Steinway" pianos. 106 Finding for the defendant on
its trademark infringement counterclaim, the court explained: "We decline to
hold, however, that actual or potential confusion at the time of purchase
necessarily must be demonstrated to establish trademark infringement under the
circumstances of this case."107 The court argued that the issue was not that a
customer would actually purchase a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was a
Steinway, but that "a consumer, hearing the 'Grotrian-Steinweg' name and
thinking it had some connection with 'Steinway,' would consider it on that basis.
The 'Grotrian-Steinweg' name therefore would attract potential customers based
on the reputation built up by Steinway in this country for many years."'108
The concept of initial interest confusion has also been applied in cases where
a company has created a private label product that had a different name but was
made to intentionally look like another product. In McNeil-PPC v. Guardian
Drug Co. the court found that defendant's use of look-alike packaging on its non-
prescription medicine amounted to trademark infringement because it served to
"'hook' customers at the initial point of contact with the product, thus initially
drawing the customers to its product through the similarity in trade dress."10 9 The
court stated that although the consumer is likely to realize the true source of the
product before the sale is completed, the "[d]efendant has already accomplished
what it set out to do, which is to confuse the consumer at the point when he first
reaches for the product on the shelf It is at that point that the damage is done."1 10
The doctrine of "initial interest confusion" has had its critics. A number of
courts have held that the initial interest confusion doctrine should be actionable
only if the confusion affects the ultimate decision of a consumer about whether to
buy a product In other words, initial interest confusion is a problem only if the
trademark user is able to convert an unwitting customer. 111 Another similar
105 See id at 1334-35.
106 See id at 1335.
107 Ij at 1342.
108 Id
109 McNeil-PPC v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (ED. Mich. 1997). The
court found that defendant's private label competitive product, a look-alike digestive aid for
lactose-intolerant persons, was "virtually identical in color, design, and labeling." See id
1101d at 1074. For a further discussion of initial interest confusion and "look-alike
products" see 3 MCCARTHYsupra note 13, § 23:6.
111 See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st
Cir. 1983) (finding no confusion between appellant's registered mark of ASTRA for
phirmaceuticals and appellee's use of a similar mark on a computerized blood analyzer
machine because, although there was evidence of temporary confusion among hospital
administrators, there was "no evidence whatsoever that anyone ever bought a Beckman
analyzer thinking it came from Astra.")
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counterargument to the initial interest confusion doctrine is that very often the
confusion, if it exists, is so fleeting that it should not be actionable.1 12
2. Why Initial Interest Analysis Is Inappropriate in Metatag Cases
The first problem with applying the initial interest confusion doctrine to
metatag claims is the fundamental weakness of the doctrine itself. The doctrine
extends the protections of trademark law from situations where confusion leads to
captured customers to situations in which a few people may be confused
temporarily.113 If consumer protection is the fundamental basis for trademark
law, then it is not appropriate to extend trademark law to protect the rare and
unreasonable consumer who is temporarily confused.
The second problem with applying the initial interest confusion analysis to
the metatag cases is that the doctrine is more appropriately applied to cases in
which a company uses a visible mark in a proactive attempt to make consumers
believe that the product they are actually looking at or holding is another product
entirely. It is appropriate, for example, when a company in the oil industry uses
the name 'Tegasus" together with a flying horse and the Mobil colors to identify
its own goods,114 or when a drug maker creates labeling that looks confusingly
similar to its competitors' labels.1 15 In other words, it is appropriate when the
defendant hopes that the consumer will look at his product and think that she is
actually looking at a competitor's product A metatag, however, does not have
this same power to create visual associations.116 The search engine user is not
searching for one product and finding a product that has intentionally been made
to look like the one for which they are searching. The metatag user is searching
for one product and getting a list that contains that product, as well as other
competitive products. The inclusion of the typical defendant's site in the search
engine results list does not have the same power to grab and confuse consumers
as the placement of a look-alike product on a shelf.
This look-alike product issue was exemplified by the Brookfield court's
analogy of metatag use to "posting a sign with another's trademark in front of
one's store." The court wrote:
112 See Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp 1407,
1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that plaintiff had not proved a likelihood of success on its
.ervice mark infringement claim because it had "only demonstrated an initial confusion on the
part of Web browsers using the domain name 'teletech.com' but finding the Defendant's
website. This brief confusion is not cognizable under the trademark laws" (emphases added)).
113 See id (noting that brief, initial confusion is not cognizable under the trademark laws).
114 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F. 2d 254,260 (2d. Cir. 1987).
115 See McNeil PPC v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074-75 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
116 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083
n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see also supra Part IV.A.1.
[Vol. 62:973
TRADEMARK & INTERNETME TA TAGS
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it 'Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a
highway reading--"West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"--where West Coast
is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for
West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to
locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance,
they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not
worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster
right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that
they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that
Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast Nevertheless, the
fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill. 117
This analogy, however, is not exactly accurate. In the case cited by the
Brookfield court-Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylcol 18---the
defendant, a video rental store, attracted the initial interest of customers by
placing a sign in front of its own store that was confusingly similar to
Blockbuster's trademarked sign. As consumers drove by, they approached and
entered the competitor's store believing it was Blockbuster. The issue in metatag
cases is different. In the metatag cases, a user who searches a search engine for
"moviebuff' is then presented with a search results list that includes a large
number of possible matching websites. At this point as the user peruses the
search results page, she has not been confused into entering one site believing it is
actually the site she is looking for. She does not to extend the analogy, believe
she is about to drive up to a Blockbuster store. Instead, she knows that she must
glance at all of the road signs before finding the one that leads her to her desired
destination. In fact, none of these road signs is painted to look like a Blockbuster
sign. If it were-i.e., if more than one of the domain names in her search results
list were "blockbuster.con" or some variation-then the dispute would be about
the domain name and not the metatag use of the trademark. In this regard there is
no initial interest confusion. 119
The court in Netscape, in fact applied the same sign-diversion analogy to
reach a different conclusion about initial interest than the Broolfield court.
Because it believed that the metatags were not actually trademarks, the court
found that, "the analogy is quite unlike that of a devious placement of a road sign
1 17 Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir.
1999) (citing Blockbuster Entm't Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513 (1994) (finding
trademark infringement where the defendant, a video rental store, attracted customers' initial
interest by using a sign confusingly similar to its competitor's even though confusion would
end long before the point of sale or rental)).
118 Blockbuster, 869 F. Supp. 505.
119 See also the Broolfield court's discussion of actual confusion, supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURATAL
bearing false information." 120 The court said the situation was "more akin to a
driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign that reads 'Fast Food Burgers'
to find a well-known fast food burger restaurant next to which stands a billboard
that reads: 'Better Burgers: 1 Block Further.' ' 121 At that point according to the
court: 'The driver, previously enticed by the prospect of a burger from the well-
known restaurant now decides she wants to explore other burger options." 122
Continuing its analysis of the initial interest doctrine as applied to metatags the
Netscape court stated:
PEI's [Playboy's] argument (unsupported by any evidence) that there is "initial
interest confusion" proves too much. Under PEI's theory, as long as the defendant
uses the words in plaintiff's trademark, there is "initial interest confusion." This is not
the law. The "initial interest confusion" cases deal with a defendant-competitor's use
of plaintiff's trademark, which is not the situation here. Further, in this case, the
search results page specifically has a "link" to PEI's website.123
What the court appears to be saying is that in order to cause confusion-
even initial interest confusion-the use must be as a visible mark with the power
to create an association in the consumer's mind. This argument supports the
author's contention that a metatag--because it is never seen by the consumer and,
therefore, cannot create a visual association between products-cannot cause
source confusion, either initial interest confusion, or confusion prolonged to the
point of purchase.
3. The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine in Recent Metatag Cases
A number of U.S. Circuit Courts have attempted recently to apply the initial
interest confusion analysis from Brookfield Communications. The disparity
among their analyses and outcomes further reveals the problems with this
doctrine in the context of keyword metatags.
In one example, drug-maker Eli Lilly (Lilly) sued herbal supplement
marketer Natural Answers for infringing on Lilly's Prozac trademark. 124 Natural
Answers marketed its herbal supplement Herbrozac as an alternative to the
prescription drug Prozac. In addition to making comparisons to Prozac in its
advertising, Natural Answers included the name Prozac in the keyword metatags
on its website. Although the court found no evidence of actual confusion, it did
find "significant risk of initial confusion" in part because Natural Answers used
the metatags "in an attempt to attract the attention of Internet surfers looking for
120 Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
121 Ia
122 I l6
123 Id.
124 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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information about Prozac." 125 The court reached this conclusion despite a finding
that the Prozac "metatags apparently did little to raise the visibility of the
Herbozac webpage" since tests indicated "that the Herbrozac webpage was
swamped [in the search engine results listings] by many other webpages with far
more references to Prozac." 126 In other words, despite clear evidence that
Herbrozac's practices could not lead to significant confusion, and despite the fact
that Natural Answer used the Prozac name only to make comparisons to its own
product, the court found that a trademark violation was likely and issued an
injunction.
In another recent case, the Northern District of California again failed to
separate the infringing uses of a trademark on a website from the use of
trademarks in metatags. The case pitted investment guru Ken Roberts against Hi-
Tech Futures Trading, an investment company whose website used pictures of
Roberts and text to suggest that it was affiliated with Roberts. 127 The court found
initial confusion because Hi-Tech used metatags "which do not accurately
describe its site" and used "the exact same image of [plaintiff] Ken Roberts on its
site as is used on plaintiffs' actual site."128 The court also found that Hi-Tech's
metatag use was likely to deceive Internet users "when they are searching for
plaintiff on the Internet or when they are viewing IIi-Tech Futures' website."129
The court's reference to the use of the plaintiff's image on the website and the
deception occurring "when [users] are viewing Hi-Tech Futures' website,"
suggests that the trademark violations may have occurred on the website itself and
not through the use of metatags.130 These are just two in a set of recent cases that
have inappropriately extended the initial interest confusion doctrine to keyword
metatag cases. 131
125 Id at 845.
126 Id at 839.
127 The Ken Roberts Co. v. Go-To.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6740 (N.D. Ca., May 10,
2000).
128 Id at *10.
129Id at *10-11.
130 See arguments injra Part V.
13 1 See also N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d 331,339 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (finding initial interest confusion although defendant's
home page(s) "clearly indicated that the site belonged to ELA [defendant's business], stated that
the 'site is not affiliated with' the Society, and provided a hyperlink to the Society's website at
'www.nysscpa.org"); 777388 Ontario Ltd. v. Lencore Acoustics Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8404 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2000) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss section 43 metatag
claim and citing the discussion of initial interest confusion in Broolfield Communications). The
Lencore court suggested that initial confusion might be created because defendant used
metatags "delilerately ... in an effort to steer Intemet browsers looking for information on
[plaintiff's] products to the site, where in turn promotional material may be found that fosters
the impression that there is no difference between the [plaintiff's] and [defendant's] line of
sound-masking equipment." Id at 17, (emphasis added). This focus on the location of the
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C. Trademark Dilution Inappropriately Applied
As stated previously, dilution occurs when the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish its goods or services is reduced due to defendant's
unauthorized use of the mark.132 Some commentators have argued that the
dilution statute provides a perfect solution to the co-opting of goodwill through
metatag infringement 133 However, these comments distort the intent of the
dilution statute. The statute was intended to cover cases where no actual
confusion exists, but where the value of the plaintiff's mark is lessened due to
associations created by defendant that cause a blurring or tamishment of
plaintiffs mark.134
In Playboy v. AsiaFocus International, the court found trademark dilution
through metatag use, stating that AsiaFocus's use of Playboy's trademarks in
metatags would "probably" create confusion.135 However, the dilution statutes do
not exist to cover cases of "probable" confusion, only to prevent a devaluing of
the plaintiffs mark. More importantly, the AsiaFocus court's analysis deals
primarily with the use of plaintiffs marks within the website itself. The court
concludes, without analysis, that because Playboy's advertising has resulted in its
marks acquiring "such goodwill and secondary meaning" and because:
the public has come to associate the PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY trademarks
exclusively with PEI. It is clear that the capacity of PEI to identify its goods and
services was diminished by the defendants' use of the terms to promote not only their
website, but the goods and services offered in connection therewith.136
promotional material suggests, again, that the site itself may actually constitute the infringing
uses.
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 111996).
133 See, e.g., Mark E. Chancey, Comment: Metatags and Hypertext Deep Linking: How
the Essential Components of Webauthoring and Internet Guidance Are Strengthening
Intellectual Property Rights on the World Wide Web, 29 STEtsON L. REv. 203, 225 (1999):
"Absent a legitimate use, the unauthorized use of another's trademark in a metatag will always
dilute the distinctiveness of the mark. However, this will more than likely never cause the
requisite consumer confusion needed to prove a traditional infingement claim. ... Thus,
dilution is the more legally sound argument. . . ." Id (emphasis added).
134 See supra Part II.B.
135 The court wrote:
The defendants' willfulness is further established by their purposeful tactic of embedding
the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden computer source code. This
strategy epitomizes the "blurring" of PEI's trademarks. When a search engine led a consumer to
the asian-playmates website in response to a search of PEI's trademarks, the consumer would
probably believe that the defendants' website was affiliated with PEI.
Playboy Enters. v. AsiaFocus Int'l, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *21 (E.D. Va. 1998).
136Id. at *20. The court also wrote:
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While evidence suggests that the court's finding of dilution through the use of
plaintiff's trademarks in the domain name playboyxxx.com and throughout the
website itself was likely correct, there is no evidence that defendant's metatag use
alone diluted Playboy's marks. The AsiaFocus decision, therefore, provides very
little valuable direction for analyzing trademark dilution through metatags claims.
In deciding on the dilution claim presented in its case, the Netscape court
came to a different conclusion than the court in AsiaFocus. The Netscape court
believed that dilution could not occur if there was no visual mark to create an
association in the minds of consumers. In the court's opinion: "Excite and
Netscape have not used PEI's marks to identify goods or services. Therefore,
there is no blurring." According to the court, the reason that dilution cannot occur
with a metatag use is the same reason that infringement cannot-because a
metatag use is not a use as a mark.137
V. A RETuRN TO EXISTING INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
Unsure of how to handle the new technology of metatags, the courts have
extended the trademark laws beyond lawmakers' original intent. As a result of
this judicial activism, a body of case law now exists that is so complex, unclear,
and inconsistent that it is difficult to determine when a metatag use amounts to a
fair use or trademark infringement. The appellate courts must now do a number of
things to return the law to a state of clarity.
At the very least, the courts must abandon the idea that the use of trademarks
in keywords amounts to de facto trademark infringement This means, at the most
basic level, that the courts must not be so quick to disregard the fair use defense.
If a metatag user contends that the metatags in question are being used in a
descriptive sense to refer to its own products, that claim should be considered
seriously. Under facts where the keyword in question truly has secondary
meaning that can be applied to describe defendants' goods, a. fair use defense is
appropriate. In addition, if the defendant is using the metatags to attract users to a
The plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish that the blurring of the
distinctiveness of PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY was willful. The defendants specifically chose
to copy famous trademarks for a well-known source of "adult" entertainment for use in their
own "adult" service. In doing so, they reaped the benefit of the public's established association
of the trademarks PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY with adult entertainment No other purpose
appears for choosing PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY but to create that false association in the
mind of the consuming public.
Id
137 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1088-89 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (citing Revlon Consumer Products Corp. v. Jennifer Leather Broadway, Inc., 858 F.
Supp. 1268, 1277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that leather furniture seller's use of the phrase
"only Revlon has more colors" did not violate New York dilution statute; defendant did not use
plaintiff's mark to identify defendant's goods)).
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website in which good faith comparisons are made to plaintiff's products, the
court should consider this a comparative good faith use.
However, in order to truly engage in an effective analysis of trademark
inflingement through metatags claims, the courts must go one step f'urther. Since
there are substantial questions about whether a metatag use is a use as a mark at
all, courts should begin their analysis with a rebuttable presumption that the use
of a trademark in a keyword metatag is a fair use. This paradigm would force the
courts to engage in the second half of traditional infringement analysis-deciding
whether there exists a likelihood of confusion under an eight-part test
This likelihood of confusion analysis can be conducted effectively only if the
courts look directly at evidence on the destination website and not at the metatags
themselves. This model acknowledges reality-that the use of a trademark in a
metatag alone reveals almost nothing about the likelihood of confusion. While it
can serve as evidence of intent to confuse, the use of a trademark in metatags
cannot create confusion by itself Under this model, a plaintiff would never bring
an infringement through metatags claim without also claiming that something on
the destination website itself created confusion or diluted the plaintiff's marks.
This approach revives traditional infingement and dilution analysis as it applies
to the marketing and promotion of websites. The result would be appropriate
limits on recent judicial activism in the metatag area and clearer guidelines for
metatag users.
The likelihood of confusion analysis can be effective in these cases, as some
of the decisions that look at both the metatag and domain name claims suggest
The court in AsiaFocus appears to have begun an eight-factor analysis of the use
of the website in conjunction with the metatags and found evidence of actual
confusion created by the combined use of the trademarks in the website and in the
AsiaFocus website itself.138 In contrast, the Netscape court; discussing the
likelihood of confusion, struggled to apply the eight-factor test to the metatag
dispute-mostly because it believed that the metatag use was not the use of a
mark 139
138 See AsiaFocus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *8.
139 The Netscape court found the eight factors either did not apply or cut in favor of
defendants Netscape and Excite. The court found that the first and third factors of the eight-
factor test-the "strength ofmarkl' and "similarity of marks" factors-would not apply because
Netscape did not use trademarks to identify goods. In addition, the court found that the second,
fifth, sixth, and eighth factors--"proxirnity of goods," "similarity of marketing channels,"
"degree of purchaser care," and "likelihood of expansion of product line"--would not apply
because "Excite and Netscape do not compete with PEI and do not use PEL's marks to identify
goods or services, nor do they plan to do so." The court also found that the fourth factor-
"actual confusion"-did not apply because PEI had presented no surveys or other evidence of
confusion. Finally, the Netscape court found that PEI had not proved the seventh factor-
'Intent to confuse." See Netscape, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-87.
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This proposed framework acknowledges the reality that the use of metatags
to identify a competitor's site creates little, if any, consumer confusion. This is the
critical difference between the use of a trademark on a website and the use of a
trademark in a metatag. The website, either the domain name or the site itself, can
create an association in the minds of consumers. 140 The "invisible" metatag use of
a descriptive mark cannot Perhaps because the metatag claims have most often
been associated with Web domain name cases, the courts have failed to note this
critical distinction. 141
The Broolfield court's bundling of the uses of a trademark to "describe
[your] own product" in the case of a website, and "to attract people to [a]
website," in the case of metatags, highlights this problem.142 One of these uses
presents very real concerns about consumer confusion and the other does not.
West Coast's use of Brookfield's trademark in the website domain name is a very
visible identification of its products or services. Consumers are very likely in that
situation to make a mental association between the domain name-for example, a
domain name called playboyxxx.com--and the original trademark holder.143 In
addition, the domain name appears throughout the domain name holder's
advertising and publicity materials. Imagine, for example, all those t-shirts,
playing cards, fuzzy dice, and assorted other promotion items featuring the
domain name playboyxxx.com. The use of trademarks "to attract people to your
site,"144 however, has never been deemed by trademark law to be an infringement
on another's trademark. The metatag use is really a very different case. When a
company uses a competitor's trademark in its own metatags it is seldom
attempting to suggest that it is the source of the competitor's products. In order to
give the separate problems of trademark infringement through domain names and
destination websites their proper due, the courts must carefully draw the
distinctions between these issues and the issue of the use of trademarks in
metatags.
140 One commentator has suggested that website developers should consider placing a
disclaimer on their websites that would notify consumers "that the website and owner of the
website are not sponsored or affiliated with any owners of the specific trademarks used on the
website, including those constituting hyperlinks." Kuester & Nieves, supra note 17, at 277-78.
However, if there is no infringing use on the website, this disclaimer would be unnecessary.
141 In the case of domain names, the opportunity for fair use of the protected trademark is
clearly being exceeded. There is no wayto simply borrow or "use" a protected trademark when
you use it in your domain name. For example, in the Post-it case, if Taylor used the domain
name "post-itcom" to identify its site then 3M could not also use that site because the domain
name was already taken. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp 2d 10003, 10005(D. Minn. 1998). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.142 Brookfield Comms. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999).
143 SeeAsiaFous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *8.
144 Broolfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1066.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important thing for the courts to understand is that they do
not need to grasp at straws to protect companies from "metatag infringement." If
the doctrine of fair use is applied to the Internet as it is applied to traditional
commerce, it will often allow for the use of trademarks in metatags. Establishing
a rebuttable presumption of fair use in metatag cases would force the courts to
engage in traditional trademark infringement analysis. However, for this analysis
the courts should consider not the metatag itself, which will likely never create
confusion, but the totality of the metatag use with the infringing use of trademarks
in the destination website. If the use of the plaintiffs trademarks within the
destination website creates a likelihood of confusion under traditional analysis-
and not under initial interest confusion analysis-then, and only then, should the
infringement be actionable. One thing is certain. The federal courts must quickly
begin to sort through this complicated morass to arrive at some consistent
guidelines that help further the expansion of the global Internet
